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In five studies, the authors examined the effects on cognitive performance of coherence and incoherence
between conceptual and experiential sources of affective information. The studies crossed the priming of
happy and sad concepts with affective experiences. In different experiments, these included approach or
avoidance actions, happy or sad feelings, and happy or sad expressive behaviors. In all studies, coherence
between affective concepts and affective experiences led to better recall of a story than did affective
incoherence. The authors suggest that the experience of such experiential affective cues serves as
evidence of the appropriateness of affective concepts that come to mind. The results suggest that affective
coherence has epistemic benefits and that incoherence is costly in terms of cognitive performance.
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In science and in everyday life, we often seek evidence for the
truth or appropriateness of our cognitions, concepts, and beliefs. In
that regard, it is frequently the case that “seeing is believing.” For
Descartes (1641), however, reason alone allowed humans to iden-
tify what is true. He asserted that the first principle should be “I
think, therefore I am . . .” (p. 19). Descartes held that discerning
truth depends on our ability to “clearly and distinctly conceive” (p.
20). Thomas Jefferson was also a great proponent of reason, but in
an 1820 letter to John Adams, Jefferson asserted that ultimately,
we must rely on our senses to discern reality. In his letter (1820/
1993), Jefferson wrote:
“I feel, therefore I exist.” I feel bodies which are not myself: there are
other existences then . . . .On the basis of sensation . . . we may erect
the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need . . . .When once we
quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind . . . .A single sense may
indeed be sometimes deceived, but rarely; and never all our senses
together . . . .They evidence realities.
Unlike Descartes, Jefferson asserted the priority of experiential
knowledge over conceptual knowledge. He concluded that our
feelings are the most compelling evidence for the truth of our
knowledge about the world.
A compatible contemporary view is expressed in the feelings-
as-evidence hypothesis (Clore & Gasper, 2000). It posits that
belief-consistent feelings are often experienced as confirmatory
evidence, making the beliefs seem particularly valid. In such
instances, feeling is believing. Such internally generated feelings
may be compelling because they are experienced in a manner
similar to the sensory feelings elicited by external stimuli. Unlike
conceptual knowledge, which is indirect and subject to verification
(Kruglanski, 1989), affective and sensory feelings are experienced
directly and are generally not subject to further verification.
People’s cognitions and the experience of their senses are gen-
erally consistent, and we expect them to be so. Thus, the truth
value of a concept can be adjudicated by information from the
senses. In contrast, the affective value of a concept, because it
concerns the goodness or badness of things, cannot be validated by
looking, listening, or touching. The experiences available to sup-
port affective concepts are either consensual (e.g., with reference
to the affective reactions of others) or self-generated. Self-
generated experiences would include one’s own affective feelings,
affective expressions, and affectively relevant actions. Thus, find-
ing ourselves smiling would validate the appropriateness of a
positive concept that became accessible in some situation, whereas
finding ourselves frowning would not. Such confirmation or dis-
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confirmation of affective thoughts by embodied affective reactions
is an important way in which mind and body interact. In this
article, we examine how affective expressions, feelings, and ac-
tions function as such confirmation and disconfirmation of affec-
tive mental content.
Strack and Neumann (1996) proposed a theoretical model to
account for how both conceptual and experiential sources of in-
formation might be represented and might interact to influence
behavior. They proposed that information from the environment
can be represented in two modalities—one conceptual and one
experiential. They defined noetic knowledge as memory-based,
stored associations and experiential knowledge as phenomenolog-
ical, physical experience in a given moment. Both noetic and
experiential knowledge can be valenced, and when these sources
of knowledge become coactivated, they can be either concordant
or discordant and have consequences for both epistemic and be-
havioral outcomes. Although it was not our aim in the current
research to explicitly test the predictions of Strack and Neumann’s
model, we nevertheless find their approach to be a useful organiz-
ing framework for our proposal that the coherence between affec-
tive concepts and affective experiences can have epistemic conse-
quences for ongoing behavior.
Affective Coherence
Affective coherence versus affective incoherence, in the present
article, concerns the extent to which experienced affective reac-
tions (such as feelings or other bodily experiences, including
approach or avoidance behaviors, and affective expressions) vali-
date coexisting activated affective concepts. We view activated
affective concepts as hypotheses about evaluative aspects of the
world, which can be either confirmed or disconfirmed by subjec-
tive experience. When experience validates an affective concept,
we speak of affective coherence, and when experience invalidates
an affective concept, we speak of affective incoherence. We expect
affective coherence, relative to incoherence, to have beneficial
effects on cognitive performance. Such confirmation allows a
person to attend to other things. When experience conflicts with
belief, people are motivated to resolve the conflict, which may
interfere with other attention-demanding activities and decrease
cognitive efficiency.
Response coherence is a somewhat different concept, which is a
central tenet of some emotion theories, whereby emotions are
believed to comprise coordinated sets of experiential, behavioral,
and physiological responses. Whether emotions involve strong
response coherence is currently a matter of debate. Evidence for
coherence is mixed (see Barrett, 2006, for a review). However,
Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, and Gross (2005) have
recently reported strong associations among experiential, expres-
sive, and physiological measures of emotion in episodes of amuse-
ment and sadness. Similarly, Bonanno and Keltner (2004) found
response coherence between facial expressions and appraisals dur-
ing narratives of emotional events. Such studies address questions
about the nature of emotion, whereas the current studies assess the
consequences for cognitive performance of affective coherence
and incoherence.
The purpose of the present research was to examine the role of
coherence and incoherence between affective concepts and expe-
riences in task performance. We proposed that when embodied,
enacted, or experienced affective reactions validate current affec-
tive concepts, ongoing processing is likely to proceed smoothly.
However, affective reactions that invalidate current affective con-
cepts create an epistemic problem, which may compete with on-
going processing and degrade performance. To examine this pro-
cess, we manipulated the experiences of engaging in approach–
avoidance action, of being in a momentary mood, and of making
facial expressions, and whether they validated or invalidated mo-
mentarily accessible concepts. We expected that affective coher-
ence would produce a subjective sense of fluency that would allow
a person to infer that “all is well,” whereas an experience of
disfluency would motivate efforts aimed at inconsistency resolu-
tion, which should hamper performance on other cognitive tasks.
Fluency refers to properties of continuous information process-
ing, such as speed or ease of processing (Reber, Winkielman, &
Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman,
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Generally, fast, effortless,
or fluent processing of information elicits positive affect. For
example, electromyographic measures indicate that fluency is as-
sociated with activation of the zygomaticus muscle used for smil-
ing but not with the corrugator muscle used for frowning (Wink-
ielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Feelings of fluency should occur when
multiple sources of affective information (e.g., emotional feelings
and expressions) are in sync (Richards & Gross, 2000). The
experience of fluency, like the experience of positive affect, sig-
nals the absence of problems, thus allowing full attention to be
devoted to whatever task is at hand.
The current research on coherence is, however, not limited to
positive thoughts, feelings, and expressions but is equally relevant
to negative affect. For example, feeling sad in response to anoth-
er’s sadness is an example of affective coherence in the sense that
it validates the feelings of the sad other (Martin, Abend, Sedikides,
& Green, 1997). In a related way, feeling sad in response to a sad
play, novel, or film would be coherent with and would validate the
intent of the author, leading to a positive evaluation of the work.
Feeling sad in response to terrible life events would be coherent
but presumably would not lead to positive evaluations of the event.
Nevertheless, such coherence should be experienced as appropriate
and be conducive to fluent processing.
As these examples suggest, the confirmation of positive or
negative affective concepts by corresponding experiences is one
form of affective coherence. However, we intend affective coher-
ence to be a broader concept than instances of direct valence
matching. Affective coherence could also be achieved by engaging
in action appropriate to activated concepts. Thus, experiencing the
muscular feedback from smiling would be affectively coherent
with entertaining positive concepts, as would engaging in approach
behavior. The instances of affective coherence examined in this
article involved the validation of affective meaning through em-
bodied affective reactions, including actions (Studies 1 and 2),
feelings (Study 3), and expressions (Studies 4 and 5). We hypoth-
esized that there are epistemic benefits to affective coherence and
epistemic costs to affective incoherence and that these costs and
benefits should influence processing efficiency as reflected in such
cognitive measures as reaction time and recall. Relevant evidence
for this hypothesis can be found in various literatures, as discussed
in the next section.
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Support for the Affective Coherence Hypothesis
Three lines of work suggest the importance of affective coher-
ence: (a) research on emotion regulation (Richards & Gross, 1999,
2000), (b) research on affective certainty (Tamir, Robinson, &
Clore, 2002), and (c) research on affectively relevant motor be-
havior (Brin˜ol & Petty, 2003; Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson,
1993; Fo¨rster & Strack, 1996, 1997, 1998; Neumann & Strack,
2000).
Affective Coherence and Emotion Regulation
People sometimes try not to show their true feelings and may
adopt facial or other expressions that do not reflect how they feel.
Richards and Gross (1999, 2000) have examined such emotion
suppression. They found that participants attempting to suppress
their emotions by actively inhibiting observable emotional expres-
sions showed impaired memory performance compared with par-
ticipants who were free to exhibit emotional expressions. For
example, in one experiment (Richards & Gross, 2000), participants
watched a film clip of an interpersonal confrontation. Half of the
participants were asked to suppress any emotional expression, and
half watched the film without such instructions. Suppression did
not change their emotional experiences but did affect their recall
and their confidence in their recall.
In another study, Richards and Gross (2000) compared emotion
suppression with reappraisal of the event. The reappraisal condi-
tion consisted of looking at slides of injured people from the
perspective of a medical professional. A memory deficit was found
for the emotion suppression group but not for the reappraisal
group. Those authors suggested that emotional suppression, like
other forms of self-regulation (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven,
& Tice, 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), is an effortful process
drawing on limited resources.
We suggest that such suppression involves affective incoher-
ence. That is, participants in the suppression condition adopted a
nonaffective expression that did not match their affective interpre-
tation of the film. However, the reappraisal condition of the
experiment would not have involved incoherence, since partici-
pants’ new, nonaffective interpretations would have been matched
by the nonaffective expressions they had adopted.
Affective Coherence and Affective Certainty
Tamir et al. (2002) reported differences in information-
processing efficiency when current moods were either consistent
or inconsistent with chronic trait affect. They suggested that when
momentary affective feelings correspond to people’s beliefs about
their usual affect, they serve as data confirming the person’s
self-view. Thus, happy feelings confirm beliefs about being a
happy person, whereas unhappy feelings confirm beliefs about
being an unhappy person. This kind of match of belief and expe-
rienced feelings results in what Tamir et al. (2002) termed affective
certainty. In four experiments, they found that people experiencing
affective certainty processed affective information more efficiently
than did people experiencing feelings that conflicted with their
beliefs about their usual feelings. Tamir et al. (2002) focused on
the match between affective traits and affective feelings and doc-
umented an epistemic benefit of having one’s self-expectations
confirmed in experience. The agreement between trait and state
affect that resulted in affective certainty is one form of affective
coherence. Another form can be seen in the validation of affective
concepts in motivationally relevant motor behavior.
Affective Coherence and Motor Behavior
Neumann, Fo¨rster, and Strack (2003) summarized evidence for
what they referred to as conceptual–motor compatibility. This
work involves motor behaviors such as nodding one’s head in
agreement, or shaking one’s head in disagreement, and performing
movements of approach or avoidance. For example, head nodding
can lead to better recall of positive words, whereas head shaking
leads to better recall of negative words (Fo¨rster & Strack, 1996).
From our viewpoint, motor actions have such effects because head
nodding is the appropriate response to positive words and an
inappropriate response to negative words—the match or mismatch
constituting affective coherence or incoherence—which has impli-
cations for the ability to recall the words later.
In related research, approach and avoidance behaviors in the
form of arm flexion and extension (Cacioppo et al., 1993) have
been used. Such approach and avoidance actions have been shown
to influence the retrieval of positive and negative information
(Fo¨rster & Strack, 1997, 1998), creative problem solving (Fried-
man & Fo¨rster, 2000), and the speed of categorizing valenced
words (Neumann & Strack, 2000). For example, when engaging in
approach behavior, participants are faster at judging positive stim-
uli, but when engaging in avoidance behavior, they are faster at
judging negative stimuli (Neumann & Strack, 2000). The impor-
tance of experiential factors in such phenomena is apparent from
the fact that similar effects occur when people experience only the
visual illusion that the valenced stimuli are approaching or reced-
ing.
It is often assumed that approach and avoidance actions are
themselves positive and negative in affective meaning. However,
recent investigations show that the values of approach–avoidance
action and head nods and shakes depend on the context in which
they occur. Thus, while viewing negative rather than positive
stimuli, the effects of approach and avoidance responses are re-
versed, such that approach becomes affectively negative, and
avoidance becomes positive (Centerbar & Clore, 2006). The mean-
ing of approach and avoidance can also change depending on one’s
own perceived spatial location relative to that behavior (Markman
& Brendl, 2005). Also, shaking one’s head while hearing someone
recount sad events in his or her life enhances sympathy for the
person rather than rejection (Tamir, Robinson, Clore, Martin, &
Whitaker, 2004).
Studying the effects of head movements on persuasion, Brin˜ol
and Petty (2003) replicated past findings that head nodding in-
creased persuasion relative to head shaking when persuasive ar-
guments were strong (Wells & Petty, 1980). However, the effect of
these head movements was reversed when arguments were weak.
They interpreted these findings in the context of their self-
validation hypothesis (Petty, Brin˜ol & Tormala, 2002), which
proposes that head nodding and shaking can validate or invalidate
one’s own thoughts about persuasive messages. Such movements
affect endorsement of the messages by increasing or decreasing
feelings of confidence in one’s current thoughts about the mes-
sages. Such findings are compatible with our notion of affective
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coherence as involving conceptual validation by embodied reac-
tions.
Overview of the Current Research
In each of the current experiments, affective concepts associated
with happiness or sadness were primed, and participants engaged
in one of three kinds of embodied reactions as they read a story.
The validation or invalidation of primed concepts by the experi-
enced reactions constituted affective coherence or incoherence. In
each case, participants were then administered a recall task. In
Studies 1 and 2, the embodied reactions were approach (arm
flexion) and avoidance (arm extension). In Study 3, the embodied
reactions were affective feelings induced by listening to happy or
sad music. In Studies 4 and 5, the embodied reactions involved
engaging the muscles involved in smiling or frowning. Affective
coherence then depended on the compatibility of the primed af-
fective concepts and affectively relevant embodied reactions. In
each case, the question of interest concerned whether cognitive
performance, as assessed by recall, would be influenced by affec-
tive coherence or incoherence. We expected the experience of
affective coherence to facilitate, and affective incoherence to dis-
rupt, ongoing cognitive processing, which should be apparent later
in recall performance.
Study 1: Affective Coherence Between Concepts and
Motor Behavior
The first study investigated affective recall as a function of
primed mental content and motivationally relevant approach–
avoidance behaviors. We predicted that the coherence between
such actions and the content of currently accessible thoughts
should facilitate information processing.
The relevance of such actions to recall was previously demon-
strated by Fo¨rster and Strack (1997, 1998), who asked participants
to generate the names of liked, disliked, or neutral persons while
engaging in either arm flexion (approach action) or arm extension
(avoidance action). Fo¨rster and Strack (1997) reasoned that the
positive–negative associations to approach–avoidance behaviors
and affective evaluation would lead to biased memory search.
Indeed, arm flexion was associated with the generation of more
positive names, and arm contraction was associated with the gen-
eration of more negative names. The second set of investigations
(Fo¨rster & Strack, 1998) identified an important boundary condi-
tion for arm contraction effects— the presence of an affective,
evaluative context. As previously noted by Cacioppo et al. (1993),
Fo¨rster and Strack (1998) found that the effect of arm contraction
on memory retrieval occurred only during an evaluative task such
as generating the names of liked, disliked, or neutral persons.
When names were generated first and subsequently evaluated
during arm contraction, no effect was found.
Recent results from studies by Centerbar and Clore (2006)
further clarified such approach–avoidance motor effects. They
extended the original work of Cacioppo and colleagues (1993) by
showing that the effect of approach–avoidance motor action on
evaluation of ideographs depended on subtle pre-existing differ-
ences in the affective valence of the ideographs. In contrast to the
original work by Cacioppo and colleagues (1993), both an ap-
proach action with positive ideographs and a withdrawal action
with negative ideographs produced more positive attitudes toward
the ideographs. Avoidance did not lead to more negative attitudes,
as previous data would have suggested. Centerbar and Clore
(2006) explained this result in terms of a motivational compatibil-
ity model. Approach is a motivationally compatible action for
positive stimuli, and avoidance is a motivationally compatible
action for negative stimuli. Motivationally compatible actions pro-
duced more favorable attitudes than incompatible ones, with no
evidence of a main effect of arm contraction. Further, no effect of
arm contraction was found with neutral ideographs, a finding that
further supports the compatibility interpretation.
Centerbar and Clore (2006) found additionally that motivation-
ally compatible actions affected not only evaluations of the focal
stimuli (ideographs) but also, under some conditions, evaluations
of the pleasantness of the arm contractions themselves. Thus, the
stimulus–action combination may produce an experience of flu-
ency, or positive affect, which can then affect evaluation of one’s
own momentary experience. This suggests that such motivation-
ally compatible actions might produce an experience of ease that
could facilitate ongoing processing more generally.
In the present studies, we therefore hypothesized that the effects
of approach–avoidance actions should again depend on the inter-
action of the action and the valence of primed affective concepts.
We predicted that this interaction should influence the ease of
processing and later recall of events from a story. We subtly
primed participants with happy, sad, or neutral words, using a
scrambled sentences task. To the extent that primed concepts elicit
tendencies to approach or avoid, as shown by Solarz (1960) and
Chen and Bargh (1999), we predicted that people’s particular
actions would be motivationally compatible or incompatible ex-
periences. The combinations of approach with positive primes or
avoidance with negative primes should be affectively coherent,
thereby facilitating processing of affective material during the
memory task. Alternatively, combinations of approach actions
with negative primes or avoidance actions with positive primes
should be affectively incoherent, disrupting efficient processing
and recall. Since neutral primes should have no implications for
approach–avoidance action, we expected no effects in the neutral
prime condition.
Method
Participants
Participants were 59 undergraduate students (33 men, 26
women) from the University of Virginia psychology participant
pool who took part in exchange for course credit. Participants were
tested individually and in small groups (up to 4 at a time). The data
of 3 participants were excluded from analyses because they did not
follow instructions, leaving data for 56 participants (32, men, 24
women).
Procedure
Participants were informed that they would engage in various
tasks, including isometric exercises involving their nondominant
arm. The cover story (adapted from Friedman & Fo¨rster, 2000)
suggested that the arm positions were related to differential brain
hemispheric activation. The experimenter demonstrated the correct
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arm position for both arm flexion and arm extension and explained
that for arm flexion, the participant should bend the arm at the
elbow to make a 90° angle, place the palm of the hand under the
tabletop, and press lightly against the bottom edge of the table. For
arm extension, the participant was told to extend the arm straight,
place the palm on the tabletop, and apply a small amount of
pressure against the tabletop. A booklet contained instructions for
the following tasks.
Priming procedure. The scrambled sentences task (adapted
from Costin, 1969) involved 40 strings of four words. Participants
were to underline any three words in each string that could be
combined to form a sentence. A practice item illustrated that for
each item, there were two ways to combine three of the four words
to complete a sentence. For example, the word string “the book
close read” could be combined to form either “close the book” or
“read the book.” Participants were asked to work quickly. The arm
movements were not performed during the priming task.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three priming
conditions (happy, sad, or neutral). In the happy and sad condi-
tions, half of the 40 items were valenced, and half were neutral.
Valenced items included such strings as “kids played smiled
happily” and “depressed seemed they you.” An example of a
neutral string is “the book close read.”
Recall task. Subsequently, participants read a story (adapted
from Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981) about a fictional char-
acter, “Paul.” In the story, Paul relates 10 happy and 10 sad events
from his past. On the basis of random assignment, participants
engaged in one of the two previously demonstrated arm positions
as they read the story.
Afterward, participants completed two filler tasks—drawing a
picture of the continental United States and counting backwards
from 200 by 3’s. Next, they answered questions about Paul, the
character in the story. They judged Paul’s happiness and sadness
on scales from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) and answered two
liking questions: “How favorable do you feel toward Paul?”
(5  extremely unfavorable, 5  extremely favorable), and
“How much do you think that you would like Paul if you were to
get to know him” (5  not at all, 5  very much). After
completing these judgments, participants had 5 min to write down
as many of the events as they could recall from the story about
Paul.
Reported feelings. After completing the recall task, partici-
pants rated their current feelings using 15 affect-related words.
They indicated, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely), how
much they were currently experiencing the following feelings:
“calm,” “sad,” “relieved,” “happy,” “anxious,” “cheerful,” “re-
laxed,” “aroused,” “pleased,” “distressed,” “nervous,” “misera-
ble,” “delighted,” “stimulated,” and “gloomy.” They then rated
their overall mood (“How positive or negative overall do you feel
right now?”) on a scale from 1 (extremely negative) to 9 (extremely
positive). They also rated the arm movement task in terms of
pleasantness (1  very unpleasant, 9  very pleasant) and effort
(1  not at all effortful, 9  very effortful). Participants further
indicated how enjoyable the scrambled sentences task was (1 
not at all enjoyable, 9 extremely enjoyable). Finally, participants
completed personality measures and answered open-ended ques-
tions probing for suspicions about the hypotheses.
Results
Recall
Two raters, unaware of condition, counted the number of happy
and sad events correctly recalled from the story (  .99 each for
positive and negative items), with discrepancies decided by con-
sensus.
As hypothesized, recall from the story was greater overall when
actions were motivationally congruent rather than incongruent
with primed affective concepts. Data were analyzed using a mixed-
model analysis of variance (ANOVA) for happy and sad recall
with prime valence and arm contraction as between-subjects fac-
tors and valence of items recalled as a repeated measure. The
analysis revealed only the predicted Prime  Arm interaction for
recall of events from the story, F(2, 50)  3.50, p  .04, 2 
.12.1 Planned comparisons, using contrast weights of 1, 0, and 1
for positive, neutral, and negative primes, respectively, and 1 and
1 for flexion and extension, respectively, mirrored the same
interaction pattern, F(1, 50)  5.92, p  .02 (see Figure 1 for
means). There was no difference in recall of events from the story
as a function of arm contraction across levels of the neutral prime
condition, t(13)  1.38, p  .19, ns. It is notable that there was
no differential recall of positive and negative story events across
conditions, Prime  Arm  Valence interaction, F(2, 50)  0.92,
ns.
Analyzing recall of the positive and negative items separately
showed that the Prime Arm interaction was significant for recall
of positive events by themselves, F(2, 50)  3.64, p  .03, 2 
.13, but not for recall of negative events, all Fs  1.
Ratings of Mood
Consistent with the general hypothesis, analyses of mood re-
ports showed that people reported feeling more anxious with
affective incoherence (M  5.41, SD  2.48) than with affective
coherence (M  3.75, SD  2.40), F(1, 37)  4.10, p  .051.
Likewise, they felt more gloomy with affective incoherence (M 
3.60, SD  2.64) than with affective coherence (M  2.19, SD 
1.78), F(1, 37)  4.08, p  .051. There were also several nonhy-
pothesized main effects. People reported feeling more cheerful
with the happy primes (M  5.90, SD  1.25) than with the sad
primes (M  5.43, SD  1.89), F(1, 37)  7.20, p  .01. People
felt more aroused with arm extension (M  5.95, SD  1.56) than
with flexion (M  5.35, SD  1.89), F(1, 37)  9.31, p  .01.
Ratings of Arm Contraction Task
There were no effects of the experimental conditions on either
ratings of the pleasantness, all Fs  1.46, ns, or the effortfulness
of the arm task, all Fs  1.32, ns.
Discussion
The results showed that affective coherence between actions and
affective concepts influenced cognitive performance, as measured
1 All effects sizes reported are the partial eta square statistics. For
brevity, the symbol 2 is used throughout.
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by story recall. Evidence for this conclusion was the finding that
story recall depended on an interaction between two variables—
engaging in approach versus withdrawal action while reading a
story and having had happy versus sad concepts primed. In addi-
tion to the importance of affective coherence with which we were
primarily concerned, two other aspects of these results were nota-
ble. First, the cognitive impact of engaging in arm flexion and
extension depended on what was in a participant’s mind at the
time. In no instances did the main effects of prime alone or action
alone approach significance. These results were consistent with
previously reported research (Centerbar & Clore, 2006) examining
the effects of approach and avoidance actions on evaluation.
Second, the primary impact of coherence was on the total level
of recall, regardless of the valence of the particular events that
were remembered. Compatibility between approach–avoidance ac-
tion and the valence of primed affective concepts resulted in better
recall of the entire set of story events. There was no tendency for
positive affect to cue recall of positive events, as might be pre-
dicted by a mood-congruent memory hypothesis (e.g., Bower,
1981).
The recall results were consistent with the hypothesized effect
of affective coherence on the processing of affective information.
In addition, if affective coherence produces its effects via fluency,
one might expect the experience to influence affective reactions as
well (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). In fact, participants did
report feeling more negative affect (anxious and gloomy) in the
affectively incoherent conditions. However, these effects were not
generally strong. One possible explanation is that because the
focus in Study 1 was on processing and recall, the mood measures
were not administered until after the recall task had been com-
pleted. Hence, any momentary effects on mood may have dissi-
pated by that point. In Study 2, we varied the procedure to
determine how robust the obtained effects were and whether
varying the point at which affect was measured would provide
evidence of the hypothesis that affective coherence and incoher-
ence influences the experience of fluency.
Study 2: Affective Consequences of Affective Coherence
In Study 2, some participants reported their mood immediately
after the experimental manipulation (and before the recall task),
while others reported their mood as in Study 1. We predicted that
affective coherence involving motivational compatibility of
approach–avoidance action with primed affective concepts would
produce more pronounced differences in mood when measured
immediately than after a delay.
Method
Participants
Participants were 77 undergraduate students (15 men, 62
women) from the University of Virginia psychology participant
pool who took part to fulfill a course requirement. Participants
were tested individually and in small groups (up to 4 at a time).
Two of the participants were excluded from the analyses for failing
to follow instructions, thus leaving 75 participants (14 men, 61
women).
Procedure
The procedure for Study 2 was identical to the one in Study 1
except for two changes in the sequence of tasks. First, participants
completed the same scrambled sentences priming procedure de-
scribed in Study 1 while simultaneously engaging in either arm
flexion or arm extension. That is, the arm contraction task was
paired with the priming task in Study 2, rather than with reading
the Paul story. Second, half of the participants completed the
ratings of their current mood and of the pleasantness of the arm
task and scrambled sentences task immediately after this manipu-
lation (immediate condition). The other half completed a filler task
at this point in the experiment (delayed condition). All participants
then read the Paul story. Following a filler task (drawing a map),
all participants made evaluations about the character Paul, after
which they were given 5 min for the recall task. Participants in the
delayed condition then rated their mood, the arm task, and scram-
bled sentences task. During this time, participants in the immediate
condition worked on the filler task that had been completed earlier
by those in the delayed condition. Finally, participants completed
the same surveys used in Study 1 about individual differences in
affective functioning, demographic information, and suspicion re-
garding the purpose of the study.
Results
Scoring of Recall Data
Three independent raters blind to condition scored participants’
recall of happy and sad events (s  .98 for the happy items and
.97 for the sad items, respectively), as in Study 1.
Recall
The order of time at which participants reported their moods
(before or after the Paul story) was not expected to influence recall,
and it did not, all Fs involving order  2.35, ns. As a result, this
order variable was excluded from further recall analyses.
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Figure 1. Mean number of items recalled as a function of level of
embodied affective cue and primed affect concept in Study 1. Vertical
bars  standard errors.
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Of primary interest was the influence of affective coherence on
total recall. Consistent with Study 1, the analysis indicated that
people recalled more items from the story overall when there was
coherence between affective cues. The ANOVA revealed a mar-
ginally significant Prime  Arm interaction for recall of events
from the story, F(2, 69)  2.81, p  .07, 2  .08. Planned
comparisons, using contrast weights of 1, 0, and 1 for positive,
neutral, and negative primes, respectively, and 1 and 1 for
flexion and extension, respectively, showed a significant interac-
tion, F(1, 69)  6.94, p   .01 (see Figure 2). Also as expected,
there was no difference in recall of events from the story as a
function of arm contraction in the neutral prime condition, t(24) 
0.98, p  .34, ns.
Several additional effects were also obtained. A reliable differ-
ence was found in the number of positive and negative events
recalled from the story. Overall, significantly more negative events
(M 3.36) than positive events (M 2.96) were recalled, t(74)
1.99, p .05. There was also a trend for a within-subjects Prime
Valence of Items Recalled interaction, F(2, 69)  2.64, p  .08.
Further inspection of this interaction showed some evidence for
prime-congruent recall. Specifically, positive items were recalled
at a higher rate by people experiencing positive primes (M  3.20,
SD  1.35) compared with people experiencing negative primes
(M  2.67, SD  1.46), with recall in the neutral prime condition
in the middle (M  2.92, SD  1.76). Negative items were
recalled at a higher rate by people experiencing negative primes
(M  3.63, SD  1.32) compared with people experiencing
positive primes (M  3.08, SD  1.32), with recall in the neutral
prime condition between the two (M  3.42, SD  1.70). Never-
theless, these effects did not approach significance and did not
qualify the effect on overall recall.
As in Study 1, the effect of affective coherence on total recall
was not moderated by differences in the recall of positive or
negative events from the story, as revealed by the nonsignificant
Prime  Arm  Valence of Event interaction, F  1. However,
unlike Study 1, affective incoherence produced similar deficits in
recall for both positive and negative story items.
Mood Ratings
Immediate versus delayed mood reports. Analyses showed
that, as anticipated, affective coherence between primed concepts
and motor action produced positive mood compared with affective
incoherence. Also as anticipated, this pattern appeared only when
the measure of mood was administered close in time to the expe-
rience. When mood was assessed later, participants tended to
report their feelings by contrasting them with their (presumed)
earlier feelings at the time of the affective coherent or incoherent
experience. Thus, the condition that had elicited the most elevated
mood initially (positive primes, approach) became the least posi-
tive when reported later, and the condition that elicited the least
positive mood initially (negative primes, approach) became more
positive when assessed later. These effects emerged from a sig-
nificant three-way interaction between Prime, Arm, and Time on
the single-item overall mood measure (“How do you feel right
now,” 1  very negative, 9  very positive), F(2, 63)  4.94, p 
.01, 2  .14 (see Table 1). Mood ratings were also analyzed
separately for the immediate and delayed groups.
Immediate mood reports. As predicted, participants reported
more positive moods after experiencing the affectively coherent
pairings of prime and arm, as evidenced by a significant two-way
interaction, F(2, 32)  4.79, p  .02, 2  .23, on the single
overall mood item (“How positive or negative do you feel right
now?”). The test of the planned contrasts using contrast weights of
1, 0, and 1 for positive, neutral, and negative primes, respec-
tively, and 1 and 1 for flexion and extension, respectively, was
highly reliable, F(1, 32) 8.50, p .01. This interaction indicated
that affective coherence (approach–positive, avoid–negative) was
experienced more positively and affective incoherence (approach–
negative, avoid–positive) was experienced more negatively than
the same actions with affectively neutral primes.
In addition to the effects on the single-item mood measure,
participants also reported feeling significantly more cheerful, F(2,
32)  4.18, p  .03, 2  .21; relaxed, F(2, 32)  3.76, p  .03,
2  .20; pleased, F(2, 32)  4.84, p  .02, 2  .24; and
delighted, F(2, 32)  4.84, p  .02, 2  .24, after experiencing
affective coherence, and significantly less gloomy, F(2, 32) 
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Figure 2. Mean number of items recalled as a function of level of
embodied affective cue and primed affect concept in Study 2. Vertical
bars  standard errors.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Overall Mood Rating as a
Function of Prime and Arm Contraction in Study 2
Arm position
Prime
Happy Neutral Sad
M SD M SD M SD
Measured immediately
Flexion 7.29 0.76 7.00 0.71 5.14 1.07
Extension 5.83 1.17 6.33 1.21 6.14 1.21
Measured after delay
Flexion 3.83 1.60 6.86 1.07 5.80 1.30
Extension 5.83 1.94 6.50 0.93 6.00 1.41
Note. Overall mood was rated on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 9 (very
positive).
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3.59, p  .04, 2  .19, and distressed, F(2, 32)  5.30, p  .01,
2  .26 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).
Two nonhypothesized main effects were revealed. As in Study
1, participants reported feeling significantly more aroused with
arm extension (M  3.44, SD  1.86) than with arm flexion (M 
1.53, SD  0.84), t(35)  4.27, p  .01. They likewise reported
feeling more aroused with negative primes (M 3.00, SD 1.84)
than with positive primes (M  1.67, SD  0.98), t(24)  2.25,
p  .03, with arousal in the neutral prime condition between the
two (M  2.64, SD  1.80).
Delayed mood reports. As anticipated, the affective conse-
quences of coherence and incoherence were no longer apparent by
the end of the experiment when the delayed mood assessment was
made. Analysis of the single-item mood measure revealed only a
significant main effect of prime, F(2, 31)  5.92, p  .01, 2 
.28, which reflected the tendency for later reports to be expressed
in relation to earlier feelings at the time of the prime–action
coherence or incoherence. Specifically, post hoc analyses indi-
cated that mood was more positive in the neutral prime condition
(M  6.67, SD  0.98) than in the positive prime condition (M 
4.83, SD 1.99), t(25) 3.14, p .01. Similarly, people reported
feeling more miserable after delay in the affective coherence
conditions than in the incoherent conditions, F(1, 18) 10.21, p
.01, 2 .31. Several nonhypothesized main effects also emerged.
Participants reported feeling more pleased with the negative
primes than with the positive primes, t(20)  3.49, p  .01. With
regard to mood and arm contraction, people reported feeling more
happy, cheerful, pleased, and delighted after arm extension (avoid-
ance) than after arm flexion (approach), all ps  .01. Again, these
results appear to reflect a tendency for participants to use their
(presumed) earlier feelings as a standard against which to express
their later feelings.
Ratings of arm contraction task. Ratings of the pleasantness of
the arm contraction task showed no significant effects. Primes did
influence ratings of the effortfulness, F(2, 69)  3.63, p  .03,
with arm contraction rated as more effortful in the sad prime
condition (M  4.58) than in the happy prime condition (M 
3.24), t(47)  2.16, p  .03, or in the neutral prime condition
(M  3.05), t(48)  2.45, p  .02. These effects have no obvious
bearing on the predicted effects, since effortfulness did not differ
as a function of arm position or its interaction with primes, Fs 
.26, ns.
Discussion
In Study 2, participants engaged in either an approach behavior
or avoidance behavior during a priming task designed to activate
happy, neutral, or sad concepts. We found that the affective co-
herence of engaging in an action motivationally appropriate to the
valence of the primed concept led to better overall recall of story
items, replicating the findings of Study 1. We also tested the
hypothesis that affective coherence would be associated with an
experience of fluency and thus would produce reliable differences
in positive affect. Indeed, participants reported feeling more pos-
itively after the experience of affective coherence when mood was
measured immediately.
We found some tendency for mood reports obtained after a
delay to contrast with earlier mood reports obtained at the time of
the coherence or incoherence experience. Such contrast effects are
not uncommon when aspects of the procedure encourage partici-
pants to use an earlier affective moment as a standard of compar-
ison (e.g., Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985). The current
study replicated the affective coherence effect for recall and
showed that this experience is also associated with the presence of
positive affect, as in previous investigations of fluency (e.g.,
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). We interpreted the effects as
being due to affective coherence following the motivational com-
patibility of the action and the primed concepts. Such coherence
led to greater ability to process and later recall the events in the
story.
An alternative hypothesis is that the effects were due to the
positive mood produced by affectively compatible action. Motiva-
tionally compatible action should and did lead to positive affect.
Hence, the positive mood caused by coherence may have facili-
tated recall. If so, affective coherence per se may not lead to
greater cognitive efficiency. Thus, a question raised by the results
of Studies 1 and 2 was whether the effective variable was mood or
affective coherence. In Study 3, we manipulated mood directly. As
in the first two studies, we primed positive or negative concepts
and crossed them with this mood manipulation. If the effects were
due to positive affect, then direct manipulation of positive affect
through a mood induction should result in greater recall. On the
other hand, if the effects were due to affective coherence, then the
effect of mood on recall should depend instead on its coherence
with the primed concepts.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Level of Self-Reported Feelings as a Function of Prime and Arm Contraction in Study 2
Feeling
Arm flexion Arm extension
Happy Neutral Sad Happy Neutral Sad
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Overall mood 7.29 0.76 7.00 0.71 5.14 1.07 5.83 1.17 6.33 1.21 6.14 1.21
Cheerful 6.86 1.46 3.80 1.64 4.43 1.27 4.80 2.17 5.83 1.83 5.29 2.06
Relaxed 7.29 1.38 5.60 3.29 4.71 1.70 5.60 2.30 6.17 1.17 7.14 1.35
Pleased 5.86 2.27 2.80 1.92 2.71 1.11 4.40 1.14 4.83 2.79 5.57 0.98
Delighted 6.00 1.63 1.80 1.79 3.57 1.27 3.80 2.49 4.50 1.87 4.00 2.16
Gloomy 1.57 0.53 1.20 0.45 3.57 2.07 2.40 2.19 3.83 1.94 2.57 1.90
Distressed 2.71 1.70 1.60 1.34 5.00 1.83 4.00 2.35 4.17 2.48 2.86 1.46
Note. Overall mood was rated on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 9 (very positive). The remaining feeling items were rated on a scale from 1 (not at
all) to 9 (extremely).
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Study 3: Affective Coherence Between Affective
Concepts and Mood
In Study 3, we used the same priming procedure as in Studies 1
and 2 and induced feelings of happiness or sadness using music.
We expected that induced affective feelings would provide expe-
riential evidence for the appropriateness of similarly valenced
primed concepts, producing a state of affective coherence. We
again expected such affective coherence to facilitate cognitive
processing, as indicated in better recall. In contrast, affective
feelings occurring in association with oppositely valenced primed
thoughts should constitute an experience of affective incoherence
that should be disruptive to ongoing processes, as indicated by
poorer recall.
Method
Participants
Participants were 60 undergraduate students from the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who either took part to fulfill a
course requirement or were paid $5 for their participation. The data
of 2 participants were excluded from analyses because they did not
follow instructions, thus leaving data for 58 participants (15 men,
43 women).
Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were informed that
the first activity concerned music appreciation and would consist
of listening to music for about 10–15 min. The experimenter told
participants the following:
Because previous research suggests that ratings of music are more
reliable after a short delay between hearing the music and judging it,
we will ask you to rate the music some time after you have listened to
it. During this time, we will ask you to do some activities for another
research project.
Affect induction. Participants then listened through head-
phones to happy or sad music for 12.5 min (adapted from
Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997). Music intended to
induce happiness consisted of allegros from “Eine Kleine Nacht-
musik,” “Divertimento in D,” and “Serenade in D,” all by Mozart,
whereas music intended to induce sadness consisted of parts of
“Adagio for Strings” by Barber and “Adagietto” by Mahler. While
the music was playing, the lights were dimmed, and the doors to
the rooms were closed to minimize distractions and help partici-
pants focus on the music. After 12.5 min, the music was turned off,
and the lights were turned on. Throughout the mood induction
procedure, no mention was made of the happy or sad feelings that
the music was intended to elicit.
Priming procedure. After the music ended, participants com-
pleted the happy and sad versions of the scrambled sentences task
described in Studies 1 and 2. A neutral prime condition was not
included in this study.
Recall task. Next, participants read the same Paul story as in
Studies 1 and 2, completed a filler task consisting of drawing a
map of the continental United States, and then answered questions
about the story character, Paul. They answered two questions
about Paul’s typical affect (“How sad of a person would you say
Paul is?” and “How happy a person would you say Paul is?”) on
a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely), as well as a question
about how much they liked him. After these judgments, partici-
pants completed the free recall task about Paul.
Reported feelings. Participants next rated their momentary
feelings on a scale of 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely),
using a list of 18 words similar to those used in Studies 1 and 2.
The specific words were taken from the circumplex model of
emotion used by Larsen and Diener (1992; adapted from Russell,
1980, and Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Six of the words described
pleasant feelings (“happy,” “delighted,” “pleased,” “glad,” “cheer-
ful,” “warmhearted”), six described unpleasant feelings (“sad,”
“unhappy,” “miserable,” “grouchy,” “gloomy,” “blue”), three re-
ferred to high arousal states (“aroused,” “stimulated,” “active”),
and three referred to low arousal states (“quiet,” “tranquil,” “still”).
Participants also answered questions about feelings during the
music: “How happy were you feeling while listening to the mu-
sic?” and “How sad were you feeling while listening to the
music?”
Results
Scoring of Recall Data
Two independent raters scored the recall data as in Studies 1 and
2, and the average of the two item counts was used in all analyses.
Recall
We predicted that people would recall more events from the
story in the affectively coherent conditions, when the valence of
the affective information provided by the primes was validated by
the affective feelings elicited by the music. To test this prediction,
we analyzed participants’ recall of the positive and negative story
events using a mixed-model ANOVA, with prime and music as the
between-subjects factors and valence of event recalled as the
repeated measure.
The analysis yielded a marginally significant hypothesized
between-subjects PrimeMusic interaction, F(1, 54) 3.48, p
.07, 2  .06, for recall of all events (see Figure 3 for means).
The effect was somewhat smaller than that found in Study 1,
2  .15, and Study 2, 2 .10. Consistent with the affective
coherence hypothesis, people remembered an additional 1.36 items
on average when the valence of the music was consistent with the
primed concepts than when it was not. This effect was not mod-
erated by the valence of the events recalled, as indicated by the
nonsignificant Prime  Music  Valence of Event interaction,
F(1, 54)  1, ns.
As in Study 2, a nonhypothesized interaction emerged between
the valence of the prime and the valence of the event, F(1, 54) 
4.57, p  .04. In this priming effect, happy primes led to recall of
more happy events, and sad primes led to recall of more sad
events. No such effect was found for mood.
Manipulation Check
At the end of the experiment, participants rated how happy and
how sad they had felt while listening to the music. Participants
who listened to happy music reported having felt happier (M 
6.66, SD  2.16) than did those who listened to sad music (M 
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4.45, SD  2.31), F(1, 54)  14.92, p  .001, 2  .21. Also,
participants who listened to sad music reported having felt sadder
(M 4.10, SD 2.64) than did those who listened to happy music
(M  1.97, SD  2.08), F(1, 54)  11.54, p  .001, 2  .18. No
prime or Prime  Music effect was observed.
Ratings of mood taken at the end of the experiment indicated
that many participants were no longer in the mood induced by the
music. No effects of music or of the interaction of Music  Prime
were observed.
Discussion
Consistent with predictions, the results tended to show that
affective coherence led to better story recall than affective inco-
herence. That is, there was a tendency for people to show superior
recall of the story after experiencing happy primes in happy moods
or sad primes in sad moods compared with recall shown in mis-
matched conditions. However, these effects were somewhat
smaller when mood was used as the experiential information
instead of the experience of approach–avoidance.
Neither positive mood nor primed positive concepts by them-
selves influenced overall recall. We concluded that affective co-
herence, rather than mood, led to greater cognitive efficiency.
Indeed, affective coherence enhanced recall without producing
positive mood. However, the effects were not as strong as in the
previous studies. Therefore, we designed Study 4 as a conceptual
replication using another kind of bodily cue: happy and sad facial
expressions. In addition, to determine whether awareness of the
primed concepts was necessary to produce these effects, we pre-
sented the priming words subliminally rather than within a scram-
bled sentences task.
Study 4: Affective Coherence Between Affective
Concepts and Expressive Behaviors
Expressive behaviors, such as facial expressions and postures
typical of emotional states, have been found to influence people’s
emotions (e.g., Duclos et al., 1989; Flack, Laird, & Cavallaro,
1999; Schnall & Laird, 2003; Soussignan, 2002; Stepper & Strack,
1993; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) as well as their cognitive
processing (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Su¨sser, 1994; Laird,
Cuniff, Sheehan, Shulman, & Strum, 1989; Laird, Wagener, Halal,
& Szegda, 1982; Strack & Neumann, 2000). Such expressions are
relevant to the concept of embodiment, which has recently become
prominent in cognitive science. Proponents of embodied cognition
assume that cognitive processes are influenced and constrained by
enactment and bodily involvement (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Clark,
1997; Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thomp-
son, & Rosch, 1991). The same assumptions that underlie the idea
of embodied cognition are applicable to embodied affect
(Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005).
For example, central to the embodied cognition position is the
assumption that cognition ultimately serves action. A similar as-
sumption can be made about affect because affect provides em-
bodied information about the goodness and badness of objects and
situations and about the value of enacting or avoiding particular
actions (e.g., Clore & Storbeck, 2006). In Study 4, we hypothe-
sized that the coherence of expressive behaviors that were consis-
tent with current thoughts should exert the same kind of facilitating
influence on cognitive performance as found in Studies 1–3. In
Study 4, participants were asked to adopt a happy or a sad
expressive behavior. Further, we explored to what extent aware-
ness of the conceptual information was a necessary ingredient to
our findings. Thus, instead of the scrambled sentences task used
earlier, we used a subliminal priming task (Bargh, Bond, Lom-
bardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982) to make
accessible positive or negative affective content in a maximally
subtle fashion.
Method
Participants
Participants were 133 undergraduate students (67 men, 66
women) from the University of Virginia who either took part to
fulfill a course requirement or were paid $6 for participation. The
data of 1 male participant were excluded because he failed to
follow instructions. Participants were tested individually and in
small groups (up to 6 at a time).
Procedure
Participants, seated in individual booths, were informed that
they would engage in several tasks, some involving muscle con-
tractions. The experimenter taught the participants to contract
certain facial muscles shown on an anatomical chart while moni-
toring that the correct muscle contractions were produced. These
instructions were based on procedures used in previous studies
(e.g., Duclos et al., 1989; Flack et al., 1999; Schnall & Laird,
2007), and instructions continued until the participant successfully
produced the desired expression. The experimenter was careful
never to produce the contractions him/herself, nor to label them as
emotional expressions.
For the happiness expression, participants contracted the zygo-
maticus and risorius muscles by pushing the corners of the mouth
up and back while opening the mouth a little. Ostensibly to activate
the trapezius and latissimus dorsi muscles in the back, participants
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Figure 3. Mean number of items recalled as a function of level of
affective cue and primed affect concept in Study 3. Vertical bars 
standard errors.
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sat straight up in the chair, with the nondominant hand resting on
the armrest, knees bent, and feet placed directly below the knees.
For the sadness expression, participants contracted the triangu-
laris muscle by drawing the corners of the mouth down and back
while contracting the platysma by letting the head hang down.
Ostensibly to activate the trapezius and latissimus dorsi muscles in
the back, participants drooped the shoulders and let the body go
limp while dropping the rib cage.
After this training phase, the experimenter explained the next
task to the participants and emphasized that no muscle contractions
should be performed during this task.
Priming procedure. Participants were presented with a “vigi-
lance task” that required them to respond to information on a
computer screen. This subliminal priming task was modeled
closely after the procedure described by Bargh and Pietromonaco
(1982) and Bargh et al. (1986). Instructions directed participants to
focus their gaze on a fixation point in the middle of the screen.
They were told that after seeing a very brief flash, they should
indicate on which side of the screen the flash had appeared by
pressing the “F” key with the left hand if the flash had appeared on
the left and the “J” key with the right hand if the flash had
appeared on the right. The fixation point was 56 cm away from the
participant, and stimuli were presented no closer than 2.7° and no
farther than 6° from the fixation point, ensuring that the stimuli
were within the parafoveal visual field. Stimuli were presented for
60 ms and immediately covered with a mask (“XQFBZRMQWX”)
that was also presented for 60 ms. The stimuli consisted of 12
words used in the scrambled sentences task from Study 1 and were
matched for word length across the two priming conditions. The
words for the happy priming condition were “fun,” “joke,” “glad,”
“smile,” “happy,” “giggle,” “elated,” “joyful,” “success,” “laugh-
ter,” “cheerful,” and “delighted.” The words for the sad priming
condition were “sad,” “blue,” “glum,” “mourn,” “alone,” “grieve,”
“lonely,” “gloomy,” “crushed,” “dejected,” “rejected,” and “de-
pressed.” Each word was presented four times, once in each corner
of the screen, resulting in 48 trials. To discourage participants’
anticipating the stimulus presentations, we followed the procedure
described by Bargh et al. (1986) of incorporating a randomized
delay of between 2 s and 7 s before each flash occurred.
Affect induction. Next, participants were asked to work on a
cognitive task while simultaneously performing the muscle con-
tractions (corresponding to a happy or sad facial expression and
posture) practiced earlier. The experimenter emphasized that the
contractions should never be painful in any way and that if the
contractions felt uncomfortable at any point, participants should
release their muscles a little.
Recall task. While performing the muscle contractions, partic-
ipants read the Paul story. Then participants discontinued the
contractions and proceeded to a filler task, involving perceptual
judgments about abstract stimuli for about 5 min. Next, partici-
pants answered questions about how happy or how sad they
thought Paul was. They then performed the same recall task as in
the earlier experiments.
Reported feelings. After the recall task, participants rated how
they had been feeling throughout the experiment. The scales were
the same as those used in previous research investigating affective
influences of bodily feedback and consisted of visual analogue
scales for the items “relaxed,” “angry,” “happy,” “sad,” “afraid,”
“depressed,” “upset,” and “confused.” Each item had a 4.25-inch-
long line next to it, with the anchors don’t feel at all and feel very
strongly at either end. Participants were asked to describe their
feelings by marking an “X” on the part of the line that best
described how strongly each emotion had been felt.
Affective personality measures. Participants then completed
affective personality measures, demographic questions, and an exit
question assessing how difficult it had been to follow experimental
instructions on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult).
Priming recognition task. Following Bargh et al. (1986), we
checked for any awareness of the subliminally presented stimuli.
Participants were informed that they had been shown words during
the vigilance task that would be shown again to see if the partic-
ipants recognized them. The 10 trials were presented as in the
priming task except that a trial number appeared at the center of
the screen immediately before each presentation. Participants were
asked to try to identify the word presented in each trial from a
multiple-choice response sheet. The response sheet listed three
words, one of which had been presented on that trial. While
randomly ordered across items, the choices always consisted of the
word that had actually been presented and two decoys. For exam-
ple, if “glad” had been presented, one decoy would be an unpre-
sented word of the same length and affective valence, (e.g., “joke”)
and the other an affectively neutral word of identical length (e.g.,
“long”). Participants were instructed to guess if they were unsure
which word they had seen.
Results
Scoring of Recall Data
Three independent raters scored the recall data as in the previous
studies, and their average was used in all analyses.
Recall
The main finding in Studies 1–3 was that when there was
agreement between experiential and conceptual affect cues, par-
ticipants showed better recall performance than when there was
disagreement. We again tested for this effect using a mixed-model
ANOVA, with happy and sad expressions and prime as between-
subjects factors and valence of recalled event as a repeated factor.
As expected, there was a significant Expression  Prime interac-
tion, F(1, 128)  3.97, p  .05, 2  .03, such that participants
producing a happy expression after being primed with happy
words and participants producing a sad expression after being
primed with sad words showed better recall than those with mis-
matched expressions and primes (see Figure 4 for means). No
other effects were significant, although there was a trend for a
main effect of prime, F(1, 128)  2.98, p  .09; all other Fs 
1.60.
Reported Feelings
We had expected that affective coherence between expressive
cues and subliminally activated cognitions would influence mem-
ory performance as it did. No predictions were made about
whether such expressive cues would also elicit affective feelings of
mood or emotion. Nevertheless, to determine whether they did, we
analyzed all emotion ratings using separate one-way ANOVAs
with expression and prime as between-subject factors. There was
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a main effect of expression condition on feeling depressed, F(1,
129) 4.43, p  .04, 2  .03, with more depression reported
after producing a sad expression (M 1.42, SD 1.75) compared
with producing a happy expression (M  0.88, SD  1.12).
Further, there was a main effect of expression condition on feeling
angry, F(1, 129) 4.79, p  .03, 2  .04, with more anger felt
after producing a sad expression (M  1.40, SD  1.62) than after
producing a happy expression (M  0.89, SD  1.31). However,
people did not report feeling more sad, p .29, or happy, p .64,
as a function of the expression produced. Thus, the significant
effects on self-reported emotional feelings were not specific to the
sad or happy expressions but rather produced differences in reports
of other negative affect (e.g., depression, anger). When the nega-
tive items were combined, there was a marginally significant effect
for expression condition, F(1, 129) 3.24, p .07, 2 .03, with
somewhat higher means for the sadness (M  1.56, SD  1.23)
than the happiness expression condition (M  1.21, SD  1.01).
Difficulty of Expressive Behaviors
Participants reported the sadness expression to have been more
difficult to produce (M  2.62, SD  1.10) than the happiness
expression (M  2.09, SD  1.03), F(1, 129)  7.71, p  .01,
2  .06.
Recognition Task
As noted earlier, a postexperimental recognition task manipula-
tion test modeled after Bargh et al. (1986) was used to determine
whether participants had been aware of the subliminally presented
happy or sad words. Participants circled more correct emotion
words (M  4.13, SD  1.97) than incorrect emotion words (M 
2.54, SD 1.48) and also more correct emotion words than neutral
words (M  3.24, SD  1.77).2 Indeed, a chi-square analysis
comparing the observed frequencies of the three kinds of responses
on the recognition task was significant, 2(2, N  132)  47.50,
p  .001, indicating that at least in the recognition task, the
participants had some awareness of the subliminally presented
stimuli. However, when grouping the observations by the four
experimental conditions, a chi-square analysis was not significant,
2(6, N  132)  2.69, p  .61. In other words, participants in all
conditions selected the words presented in the priming task above
chance. Further, correct recognition of emotion words was not
correlated with recall of positive (r  .01) or negative (r  .03)
items.
Discussion
The findings from Study 4 in which implicit priming was used
replicated the main finding of Studies 1–3 in which explicit prim-
ing was used. Recall was better when the experiential affective cue
was affectively coherent with the primed concepts than when it
was not. As in previous research on recall and affective expression
(Laird et al., 1982, 1989; Schnall & Laird, 2003), we found that
sad expressions resulted in more negative affect, but we did not
find any direct effect of expressive behavior on recall. Happy
expressions did not result in more positive recall, nor did sad
expression result in more negative recall. Unlike the earlier work,
we included a context of primed concepts for the expressive
behavior. Tamir et al. (2004) have shown that such contextual
factors can drastically alter the meaning of expressions.
An additional noteworthy finding was that although we closely
followed the procedure for subliminal priming developed by Bargh
and colleagues (1982, 1986), participants appeared to have had
some awareness of the subliminally primed words. Thus, we
cannot rule out the possibility that some awareness of the primed
concepts or their affective tone may be necessary to produce the
coherence effect.
In the final study, we sought to replicate the findings with
expressive behaviors, using the scrambled sentences priming task
from Studies 1–3 rather than subliminally presented primes. We
also used a different experimental recall task to examine potential
underlying processes involved in the coherence effects docu-
mented in Studies 1–4. The primary purpose in the next study was
to explore the nature of differences in processing associated with
affective coherence and affective incoherence.
Study 5: Affective Coherence and the Construction of
Narrative Meaning
In four experiments, we exposed participants to affective con-
cepts and affective experiential cues: approach and avoidance
behaviors (Studies 1 and 2), moods (Study 3), and expressive
behaviors (Study 4). We then assessed subsequent recall of affec-
tive information. In each experiment, we observed that recall was
superior when there was coherence between affectively relevant
sources compared with when there was incoherence between
sources. The evidence, when taken together, suggested to us that
participants experienced differences in fluency in these affective
contexts. Although we did not investigate mediating processes
directly, we surmised that fluency differences would have influ-
enced the ease or difficulty of subsequent processing.
2 Because some participants had one or more missing observations on
the recognition survey, the three types of responses do not sum exactly to
the number of total trials (i.e., 10).
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Figure 4. Mean number of items recalled as a function of level of
embodied affective cue and primed affect concept in Study 4. Vertical
bars  standard errors.
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As noted earlier, fluency describes the ease of processing con-
tinuous information (Winkielman et al., 2003). In the four studies
that we have reported thus far, such a metacognitive feeling of
fluency might be created when several sources of affective infor-
mation are coherent, when affective concepts and affective expe-
riences are in sync. The results of Studies 1 and 2, both of which
included a neutral priming condition, indicated that coherence was
facilitative, whereas incoherence was inhibitory, in their effects on
processing. To the extent that the fluency associated with affective
coherence is the driving force, we would expect that additional
aspects of information processing might also be facilitated. For
example, coherence would not only enhance recall but also the
ease with which recalled information is generated.
Alternatively, the presumed disfluency associated with the ex-
perience of incoherence would likely be experienced as problem-
atic and thus disruptive to ongoing processing. To the extent that
the incoherence suggests an ambiguous affective situation, people
may experience more uncertainty in how to respond to or make
sense of the situation. The affective meaning of the situation may
be unclear.
To explore the nature of qualitative differences associated with
affective coherence and incoherence, we chose to examine differ-
ences in measures of linguistic style by having people construct
self-narratives. Extensive research has demonstrated that as people
actively work to understand unpleasant life experiences, their
narrative descriptions of those experiences change. Making sense
of such experiences influences markers of emotional well-being.
For example, Pennebaker (1997) observed that the individuals who
experienced health benefits from writing about traumatic events
were those who “began with poorly organized descriptions and
progressed to coherent stories by the last day of writing” (p. 165).
People experiencing the ease and fluency associated with affective
coherence should be more likely to demonstrate corresponding
coherence in their self-generated narratives. In contrast, disfluency
associated with affective incoherence should be more likely to
manifest itself in less coherent self-narratives.
To explore these possibilities, we again exposed participants to
affective concepts as they engaged in expressive behaviors. But
this time, we measured indicators of the ease with which informa-
tion was generated and the quality of the output. An autobiograph-
ical recall task was used to provide the participant with flexibility
about the kind of information to be generated. Participants were
exposed to neutral cue words (e.g., “tree”) and were asked to think
of an experience from their own life associated with this word and
to write a brief narrative about the nature of that experience.
One of our interests was the extent to which participants gen-
erated either more or less information depending on whether they
were experiencing affective coherence or affective incoherence.
We considered two distinct possibilities. If affective coherence
results in fluency that facilitates processing generally, then partic-
ipants in the coherent conditions might be more generative in their
narratives. That is, affective coherence should facilitate the fluency
of their written expression generally, leading to longer narratives.
Alternatively, if affective incoherence motivates an attempt to
extract meaning from incoherent affective cues, then participants
in the incoherent conditions might generate more material.
Another of our interests was the qualitative content of the
generated narratives. Because certain types of words are associated
with cognitive complexity (Pennebaker & Stone, 2003), we exam-
ined the content of the narratives. In particular, we tested whether
differences in affective coherence would affect linguistic markers
of complexity (e.g., Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997; Penne-
baker & Stone, 2003). These markers include the use of long
words ( six letters) and words related to causation and insight.
Pennebaker and colleagues also found that the content of narra-
tives tends to change over time (Pennebaker & Francis, 1999;
Pennebaker et al., 1997; Pennebaker & Stone, 2003). They showed
that improvements in adjustment across writing sessions correlated
with increased use of causal and insight words, suggesting that
people had come to a more meaningful understanding of the
unpleasant life events. To determine whether temporal factors
might also influence the degree to which affective coherence
influenced self-generated narrative content, we analyzed changes
in story content across narratives.
Thus, the question posed in Study 5 was whether affective
coherence would influence general processing efficiency, such as
the length and complexity of the narratives that the participants
produced, or whether such differences would be specifically re-
lated to meaning making—the emergent meaning of the narrative
generated.
Method
Participants
Participants were 144 undergraduate students (59 men, 85
women; mean age, 19.17 years) from the University of Virginia
who took part to fulfill a course requirement. The data of 11
participants were eliminated from analyses because they demon-
strated suspicion about the purpose of the study, leaving the data
from 133 participants (57 men, 76 women).
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that used in Study 4, with the
following exceptions. Participants were given the same scrambled
sentences task as in Studies 1–3 and were then instructed to engage
in muscle contractions associated with happy or sad expressions as
in Study 4. However, instead of reading the Paul story, participants
engaged in an autobiographical recall task developed by Teasdale
and Fogarty (1979) and used by Schnall and Laird (2003). For this
task, participants received a cue word (e.g., “tree”) while produc-
ing the emotional expressions. Participants were asked to close
their eyes while maintaining the muscle contractions and to think
of an event from their life associated with the word. They were
instructed to think of the first event that came to mind, to consider
what the experience was like, and to recall the event in as much
detail as possible. Afterward, they wrote down the nature of the
event and the effect it had on them. To maximize variability in
responses, the experimenters did not time this task and simply
encouraged participants to “write down a couple of sentences”
about the event. The participants then rated the event on a scale
from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good) and indicated the extent to
which they had experienced various feelings when the event orig-
inally happened (“happy,” “sad,” “confused,” “angry,” “relaxed,”
“afraid,” “depressed,” “upset”). The same retrieval and ratings
procedure was repeated for each of three cue words: “tree,”
“house,” and “car.” Then participants indicated their feelings dur-
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ing the experiment using visual analogue scales for the same
adjectives (in a different order). Finally, participants filled out
personality questionnaires not pertinent to the current project.
Results
Word Count
Reports of the personal life events were analyzed using the
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LWIC) software (Pennebaker,
Francis, & Booth, 2001). The narratives resulting from the three
cue words were combined, and the total word counts obtained from
the LWIC program were submitted to an ANOVA with priming
(happy vs. sad) and expression (happy vs. sad) as between-subjects
factors. A two-way interaction of Priming  Expression emerged,
F(1, 129)  5.21, p  .02, 2  .04, with higher overall mean
word count for participants in the affectively incoherent conditions
compared with those in the coherent conditions (see Table 3).
Thus, affective coherence led to shorter, more concise narratives
than did affective incoherence.
Cognitive Complexity
We examined the degree to which differences in affective co-
herence may have influenced changes in the content of material
generated across the three narratives. For ease of interpretation, we
compared those participants in the coherent conditions (happy
prime and happy expression, or sad prime and sad expression) with
those in the incoherent conditions (happy prime and sad expres-
sion, or sad prime and happy expression). We found that partici-
pants in the coherent condition showed a linear increase in their
use of causal words (e.g., “because,” “effect,” “hence”) across the
three narratives. Participants in the incoherent condition generated
the same number of causal words across the narratives. Indeed, a
repeated measures ANOVA with condition (coherent vs. incoher-
ent) and story (1 vs. 2. vs. 3) produced a significant linear trend for
the interaction of Condition  Story, F(1, 131)  5.79, p  .02,
2 .04. Participants in the affectively coherent condition showed
a linear increase in the percentage of causal words that they used,
from 0.36% to 0.51% to 0.99% across the three narratives, whereas
participants in the affectively incoherent condition showed no
change, with 0.46%, 0.51%, and 0.51% of words being causal
across the three narratives.
A similar, though less pronounced, pattern emerged for insight
words (e.g., “think,” “know,” and “consider”). In the coherent
conditions, participants’ use of insight words increased from
0.81% to 1.64% in the first and second narratives and remained
relatively high in the third with 1.45%. Participants in the inco-
herent conditions showed no appreciable increase in their use of
insight words (1.11%, 1.15%, and 1.26%). The quadratic trend for
the interaction of Condition  Story was marginally significant,
F(1, 131)  2.89, p  .09, 2  .02.
Finally, participants in the coherent conditions used a larger
number of long words ( six letters) across time, which also is
considered a marker of cognitive complexity (Pennebaker &
Stone, 2003). Participants experiencing coherence used long words
at a rate that increased from 11.00% to 12.77% to 14.10% across
the narratives. Alternatively, participants experiencing incoher-
ence did not show such linear increase, with long words account-
ing for 12.80%, 12.26%, and 12.74% of words used across narra-
tives. Indeed, the linear trend of the Condition  Story interaction
was significant, F(1, 131)  8.95, p  .003, 2  .06.
Word Count and Affective Categories
In addition to the markers of cognitive complexity, we also
analyzed the extent to which higher word count was associated
with affectively positive or negative words contained in the nar-
ratives. For participants in the coherent condition, there was a
marginally significant correlation between word count and use of
positive emotion words (see Table 4), which was due to a corre-
lation between word count and words relating to optimism. In
contrast, for participants in the incoherent condition, there was a
significant correlation between word count and negative emotion
words used—in particular, words relating to sadness. Thus, the
longer the narrative, the more positive emotion words were used
by coherent condition participants and the more negative emotion
words were used by incoherent condition participants.
Affective Content
We further compared the coherent and incoherent conditions in
terms of the positive and negative affect categories across the three
narratives using a series of repeated measures ANOVAs. No
significant effects emerged for condition or for the Condition 
Story interaction, consistent with Pennebaker, Mehl, and Nieder-
hoffer’s (2003) conclusion that actual affective content is often
less diagnostic of psychological processes than linguistic style.
Participants’ Evaluations of the Narratives
For each narrative, participants rated the overall valence of the
recalled event, as well as how they felt during that event when it
originally happened. Whereas narrative content, as assessed with
LWIC did not show differences across the groups, participants’
self-reported evaluations of the events did. Over time, people in
the incoherent condition rated their narratives as getting progres-
sively worse on several dimensions, while no such linear trend was
apparent for people in the coherent condition. Linear trend analy-
ses for the interaction of Condition  Story confirmed the reli-
ability of these findings. Across the three stories, participants
experiencing incoherence rated the events as getting worse, F(1,
126) 4.89, p .03, 2 .04, and themselves as less happy, F(1,
131)  4.77, p  .03, 2  .04; more sad, F(1, 131)  3.71, p 
.06, 2  .03; more depressed, F(1, 131)  4.80, p  .03, 2 
.04; more angry, F(1, 129)  4.50, p  .04, 2  .03; and more
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Overall Word Count as a
Function of Prime and Expression in Study 5
Expression
Prime
Happy Sad
M SD M SD
Happy 48.00 14.58 57.88 19.06
Sad 56.21 19.78 51.88 17.46
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upset, F(1, 131)  6.52, p  .01, 2  .03 (see Table 5 for means
and standard deviations).
Participants’ Feelings During the Study
Toward the end of the study, participants rated how they had
been feeling throughout the experiment. Consistent with the find-
ings from Study 2, participants in Study 5 reported having expe-
rienced more negative affect when they were in the incoherent
condition. In particular, relative to the participants in the coherent
condition (M  0.64, SD  1.29), participants in the incoherent
condition (M  1.06, SD  1.40) gave higher ratings of feeling
sad, F(1, 131)  3.09, p  .08, 2  .02; depressed (M  0.44,
SD  0.93 vs. M  0.87, SD  1.21), F(1, 131)  5.22, p  .02,
2  .04; upset (M  .52, SD  .97 vs. M  1.02, SD  1.39),
F(1, 131)  5.72, p  .02, 2  .04; angry (M  0.41, SD  0.88
vs. M  0.71, SD  1.20), F(1, 131)  2.83, p  .09, 2  .02;
and afraid (M  .40, SD  .67 vs. M  .71, SD  1.12), F(1,
131)  3.52, p  .06, 2  .03. Thus, the consequences of
affective incoherence concerned not only the content of the nar-
ratives that participants produced but were also reflected in their
reported feelings of negative affect while generating the narratives.
Discussion
Study 5 explored whether the effects observed in Studies 1–4
might reflect a generalized experience of fluency, with accompa-
nying epistemic benefits or costs (e.g. Tamir et al., 2002). Results
suggested that affective incoherence led to an experience of dis-
fluency and carried epistemic costs. Compared with affective
coherence, affective incoherence produced self-generated narra-
tives that were less concise, interconnected, insightful, and artic-
ulate. These narratives were unaccompanied by the structural
markers typical of improved cognitive functioning over time (cf.
Pennebaker et al., 2003). Alternatively, participants in the coherent
conditions, although they wrote less overall, showed a general
increase in cognitive complexity across the three writing samples.
Increases in cognitive complexity have been associated with ben-
eficial health outcomes, presumably because they reflect increased
understanding (see Pennebaker et al., 2003). Such an interpretation
of differences in cognitive complexity markers in our data would
suggest that participants in the coherent condition achieved a
higher level of understanding of the life events they described,
using fewer words to do so. Pennebaker et al. (2003) noted, “[I]t
Table 4
Intercorrelations Between Word Count and Affective Linguistic
Categories as a Function of Affective Coherence in Study 5
Feeling
Affective coherence condition
Coherent Incoherent
Positive emotions
All positive emotions .24 .13
Positive feelings .06 .12
Optimism .37b .11
Negative emotions
All negative emotions .16 .24a
Anxiety .02 .01
Anger .05 .04
Sadness .14 .29a
a Significant at .05 alpha level. b Significant .005 alpha level.
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations in Level of Affective Evaluations of Recalled Life Events in Study 5
Affective condition Feeling
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
M SD M SD M SD
All
Overall good 4.64 1.92 4.52 1.79 4.33 2.21
Happy 4.95 3.18 5.14 3.11 4.60 3.78
Sad 2.20 2.70 2.39 2.78 2.37 3.07
Depressed 1.35 2.26 1.40 2.25 1.28 2.30
Coherent
Angry 1.79 2.47 1.75 2.77 2.25 2.91
Upset 2.82 3.34 2.74 3.03 2.94 3.43
Afraid 3.17 3.40 2.34 2.94 2.96 2.99
Confused 1.54 2.19 1.59 2.38 2.27 2.55
Relaxed 4.35 3.27 3.71 2.80 2.95 2.83
Overall good 5.13 1.66 5.00 1.52 3.76 2.08
Happy 5.81 2.71 5.47 2.66 3.63 3.67
Sad 1.65 2.15 2.47 2.71 3.06 2.97
Depressed 1.04 1.75 1.37 2.02 1.99 2.60
Incoherent
Angry 1.35 2.13 1.72 2.32 3.15 3.16
Upset 2.05 2.87 2.45 2.76 4.16 3.57
Afraid 2.54 3.09 2.05 2.57 3.59 3.14
Confused 1.81 2.46 2.07 2.51 2.84 2.96
Relaxed 4.96 3.08 4.02 2.95 2.53 2.95
Note. Feelings were rated on a scale from 1 (very bad ) to 7 (very good ).
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is striking how weakly emotion words predict people’s emotional
state” (p. 571). Our data were consistent with this conclusion
because the emotion words used in the narratives did not vary as
a function of affective coherence condition. However, there was a
tendency for the participants in the affectively incoherent condi-
tions to generate more negative events over time. Finally, we
replicated the mood results from Study 2, demonstrating differ-
ences in self-reported feelings as a function of affective coherence.
It was interesting that rather than finding differences in positive
affect, as has been reported in the fluency literature, we found that
disfluency was associated with increases in negative affect.
Along with the findings of Studies 1–4, the results of Study 5
suggested that affective coherence may influence cognitive pro-
cessing because of its epistemic benefits. The written expressions
generally suggest a concern with arriving at coherent meaning.
Individuals experiencing affective coherence responded in their
narratives with greater insightfulness and understanding of causa-
tion.
General Discussion
Four experiments showed that the recall of affective material
from a story depended on whether experiential information was
coherent with conceptualized affect. In each experiment, when
experiential cues were inconsistent with primed affective concepts,
participants’ memories suffered. This same phenomenon emerged
regardless of whether the experiential cues were from affectively
relevant actions, feelings, or expressions. A fifth study provided
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that affective coherence
has epistemic benefits. We used a variety of manipulations and
measures to examine the implications of affective coherence. For
example, affectively relevant concepts were indirectly primed in
Studies 1–3 and Study 5 and were subliminally primed in Study 4.
Experiential information included the direct experience of affect in
the form of mood (Study 3) but also experiences of affectively
relevant actions (Studies 1 and 2) and expressions (Studies 4 and
5). In addition, memory was measured by recall of a story (Studies
1–4) or by autobiographical recall (Study 5). Consistent effects
and patterns of findings were generated across all five studies.
Despite such variation in method and measures, these experi-
ments focused only on the coherence with respect to affective
valence. One can imagine similar research examining the affective
coherence with respect to arousal. Just as valence provides infor-
mation about value, arousal provides information about impor-
tance (Clore & Schnall, 2005). Thus, to be credible, affective
concepts implying great importance or urgency should be accom-
panied by experiences, actions, or expressions that also imply
importance or urgency.
In the emotion literature, research on coherence has been di-
rected toward questions about the nature of emotion. Are emotions
tightly bound, evolved modules whose existence is reflected in
expressions, feelings, and patterns of physiology that show coher-
ence, or does the absence of high levels of coherence among
emotional responses require a revision in our concept of emotion
(Barrett, 2006)? The current results do not speak to that question.
However, emotion coherence could also be examined within the
current model. To the extent that specific emotions are believed to
imply particular experiences, then one might expect that coherence
and incoherence between emotion concepts and emotional symp-
toms might have effects on cognitive performance similar to those
observed in these studies.
Context Dependency
We have emphasized how embodied experiences of affect can
function as evidence relevant to affective thoughts. In that sense,
people in everyday life act like scientists (Kelly, 1963), continually
testing the appropriateness of affective conceptions of events
against embodied affective experiences of them. But in everyday
perception, as in science, an item of data never speaks for itself.
The sensations of our senses have meaning only in context. In this
article, we opted for the term coherence to reflect the crucial role
of context. A term such as agreement might imply equality or
interchangeability among the affective cues, something that prior
data have suggested is not the case. For example, the affective
impact of approach–avoidance action (Centerbar & Clore, 2006) or
head nods and shakes (Brin˜ol & Petty, 2003; Tamir et al., 2004) is
not fixed but variable. Generally, our data showed no direct effects
of experiential inputs on either affect or performance.
In our research, and presumably in the real world, affective
concepts and experiential cues show a curious symbiosis. The
concepts provide a context within which actions, feelings, and
expressions take on affective meaning, which then provides evi-
dence of the validity of the concept. Neisser (1976) made a related
point when he indicated a preference for talking about a perceptual
cycle rather than a perception. His point was that perceptual data
are given meaning by their cognitive context but that the validity
of the cognitions in any given situation in turn depends on per-
ceptual data. Indeed, we found that flexing the muscles involved in
arm extension could have positive or negative affective meaning
depending on whether positive concepts or negative concepts were
made more accessible through priming (Studies 1 and 2). Only
after this process of acquiring affective meaning from the activated
concepts could the experience of arm extension validate or inval-
idate those same concepts. Thus, a primed negative concept made
the act of extending one’s arm in that context a positive action
because avoidance is a motivationally appropriate reaction to
negative objects. The affective coherence of this combination
validated the appropriateness of the negative concept, which al-
lowed attention to be paid to the subsequent task.
Similarly, a primed positive concept made the same act of
extending one’s arm negative because avoidance is a motivation-
ally inappropriate reaction to positive objects. The affective inco-
herence of this combination invalidated the applicability of the
positive concept, so that participants were left with an affective
problem to resolve before they could attend fully to task demands.
We re-emphasize that in these configurations, an avoidance
action and a negative concept, for example, were affectively co-
herent because avoidance is a motivationally appropriate reaction
to negative stimuli, not because avoidance is inherently negative.
It all depends on what is being avoided, a point also made long ago
by Heider (1958).
It should be clear that context dependency is often a critical part
of affective coherence. As a result of acquiring meaning from
context, embodied responses can serve as evidence for the con-
cepts. The epistemic benefits and costs of validation and invalida-
tion are assumed to be reflected in the relative ease or fluency of
processing.
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Fluency
One way to characterize these effects is to say that affective
coherence produces the experience of fluency. Recent evidence in
the study of conceptual and perceptual fluency has identified two
hallmarks associated with that experience. First, fluency has been
shown to produce positive affect, measured both in terms of
self-reported feelings and changes in physiology. Second, fluency
has been shown to have asymmetrical effects, producing changes
in positive, but not in negative affect (Winkielman & Cacioppo,
2001). Some evidence from the current studies is consistent with a
fluency interpretation.
Affective coherence not only caused differences in recall but
also differences in self-reported mood, at least when measured
shortly after the experience. In Study 2, participants reported
feeling more positive affect (“cheerful,” “delighted,” “pleased,”
and “relaxed”) under conditions of affective coherence. Thus, like
fluency, affective coherence may lead to positive affect. These
same participants also reported feeling less negative affect
(“gloomy,” “distressed”), which contrasts with the emotional
asymmetry reported in the fluency literature (Harmon-Jones &
Allen, 2001; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). We also found that
affective incoherence produced higher reports of negative affect
(Study 5). We were careful to use unipolar scales for assessing
negative affect, but Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) have argued
that people may report their negative affect essentially by assess-
ing their positive affect and reversing that assessment. It remains
for future investigations to determine whether differences in both
positive and negative affect occur as a function of affective co-
herence.
Sense Making
If affective coherence is a form of fluency, we would expect the
kinds of processing efficiency and positive affect that we observed.
Additionally, we proposed that such coherence had the epistemic
benefits of making sense of one’s affective reactions (Study 5). In
this regard, we identified reliable differences on measures devel-
oped by Pennebaker and colleagues to demonstrate the psycholog-
ical and health benefits of explaining negative life events. We
found that such meaning-making may also be applicable to posi-
tive events. In related research, Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, and
Gilbert (2005) have shown that making sense of positive experi-
ences speeds the dissipation of the associated positive affect. In
such cases, sense making may thus seem to have adverse conse-
quences, at least in terms of ongoing mood. However, these two
sets of results are not in conflict. Wilson et al. (2005) showed that
successful sense-making results in thinking less about one’s mood,
thus reducing its intensity and duration. They suggested that this
allows people to move on from their affective experiences, and we
are making a similar point. That is, affective coherence may be
beneficial for subsequent processing by allowing people to turn
their attention away from their affect to more fully engage in
ongoing tasks.
Related Conceptualizations
We offer the notion of affective coherence as a general affective
principle with potentially wide applicability, including potential
relevance to research on emotion regulation (Richards & Gross,
1999, 2000), motor behaviors (Brin˜ol & Petty, 2003; Cacioppo et
al., 1993; Fo¨rster & Strack, 1996, 1997, 1998; Neumann & Strack,
2000), self-validation (Brin˜ol & Petty, 2003, Petty et al., 2002),
and confirmation of self-beliefs (Tamir et al., 2002).
Further, relevant data come from research on persuasion. Ac-
cording to the self-validation hypothesis (Petty et al., 2002), the
influence of persuasive arguments on attitudes is not only a func-
tion of the impact of the arguments on the magnitude (extent of
thought) and direction (valence of thoughts) parameters but addi-
tionally on the metacognitive aspects of people’s confidence in
their thoughts. High confidence was found to increases the impact
of both positive and negative persuasive messages, and low con-
fidence was found to reduce their impact. Brin˜ol and Petty (2003)
further demonstrated that actions such as head nodding (agree-
ment) and head shaking (disagreement) can have effects on per-
suasion by influencing interactions with the valence or strength of
persuasive messages. Brin˜ol and Petty (2003) likewise referred to
these actions as validating or invalidating one’s thoughts about
persuasive messages, albeit through the effect that they have on
confidence. Whereas these authors focused on the role of action in
validating or invalidating specific thoughts, our focus on affective
coherence has emphasized the benefits for subsequent processing.
Also related to the current conceptualization is the affective
certainty hypothesis (Tamir et al., 2002). Like the self-validation
hypothesis of Brin˜ol and Petty (2003), the affective certainty
hypothesis focuses on the degree to which momentary affective
inputs are either consistent or inconsistent with cognitions, in this
case, self-beliefs rather than responses to persuasive arguments.
However, like us, they emphasized the epistemic benefits of the fit
between these momentary affective experiences and chronic affec-
tive beliefs. In their case, the benefits were evident in fast reaction
times for identifying things that participants did or did not want.
As such, affective certainty can be considered an example of
affective coherence, where the domain of one’s belief happens to
concern information about oneself (e.g., one’s personality) rather
than more general information about affective concepts.
Conclusions
The effect of emotion on memory has been a popular topic in
psychology. Studies have generally examined the role of affective
valence (e.g., Bower, 1981), affective arousal (e.g., Cahill &
McGaugh, 1998), or affective intensity (Loftus & Burns, 1982).
We examined a different kind of affective influence. The memory
effects that we observed lay not in affect itself but in whether
cognitive and experiential manifestations of affect were coherent.
We began this article by alluding to Descartes’ declarations about
the primacy of thought, which we contrasted to the pronounce-
ments of Jefferson concerning the primacy of feeling. Our results
suggest that beyond the roles of concepts and feelings, what is
important is their coherence. Rather than questions of whether
cognitive or bodily cues dominate behavior, as has been the focus
of prior work (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996), we emphasized their joint
action. Performance on a memory task depended on the agreement
between the cognitive content made accessible by priming and the
self-generated experiences of action, feeling, and expression. We
suggest that this kind of mind–body coherence or incoherence was
important in part because it governed the extent to which individ-
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uals could fully engage in the experimental task and hence how
much they could retrieve from memory.
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